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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical basis on the literature that focuses on the “second-
generation” fiscal rules. We develop a stochastic endogenous growth model with public
debt dynamics in which the speed of adjustment of the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on
the business cycle. We show that the degree of flexibility dramatically affects the cyclical
behavior of the government spending. The higher the flexibility degree, the lower the
volatility of fluctuations along the business cycle. Therefore, following a transitory shock,
a flexible-fiscal rule helps smooth aggregate variables by limiting the cuts in productive
public spending.
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1. Introduction
Over the past 30 years, to tackle the massive expansion of public debts, a growing
number of countries attempted to strengthen their fiscal governance frameworks by im-
plementing fiscal rules (FR).2 While the FR undoubtedly reduce the deficit bias and
may foster fiscal discipline,3 the evidence regarding their impact in the cyclical stance of
fiscal policy is largely inconclusive. This controversy may be related to the exceptional
heterogeneity of FR (Combes et al., 2017).4
1Corresponding author: maxime.menuet@univ-orleans.fr.
2Nowadays, the popularity of FR is such that, while less than 10 countries adopted FR in 1985, more
than 90 countries around the world enabled at least one type of FR by 2015 (see the IMF’s Fiscal Rule
dataset 1985-2015).
3See, e.g., Fatás and Mihov (2006); Ardagna et al. (2007); Debrun et al. (2008).
4FR can amplify macroeconomic shocks by making fiscal policy pro-cyclic (Von Hagen, 2003; Gali
and Perotti, 2003; Wyplosz, 2006), or lead to a stabilization effect through a counter-cyclical policy
(Dabla-Norris et al., 2019; Bova et al., 2014; Guerguil et al., 2017).
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In the recent empirical literature (see Eyraud et al., 2018), a clear opposition seems
to be emerging between the so-called “first” and “second” generation rules. Such a
classification shall be based on the flexible scheme of rules. Regarding the former, FR
combined simplicity and little flexibility, as the Maastricht Treaty requiring the deficit-to-
GDP ratio to be at most 3%. Regarding the latter, during the post-great-recession period,
FR have greatly expanded the flexibility provisions already embedded in first-generation
rules, such as the use of cyclically-adjusted targets, will-defined escape clauses, or with
strong legal and enforcement arrangements.
The present paper offers, to the best of your knowledge, the first theoretical analysis
that takes into account a second-generation rule. We develop a stochastic endogenous
growth model based on Barro (1990)’s endogenous growth archetype with productive
public expenditures modeled as flows of productive services in a constant-return-to-scale
production function.5 The fiscal rule is such that the speed of adjustment of the debt-to-
GDP ratio depends on the current economic activity.
Our results are twofold. (i) We highlight a new transmission channel based on the
dynamics of public debt. Following a recessive transitionary shock, the government cuts
in productive public spending to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio consistent with the fiscal
rule, hence a pro-cyclical amplification of the recessive shock. (ii) The flexibility degree
of the fiscal rule dramatically affects the magnitude of fluctuations. Under a flexible rule,
the volatility of fluctuations are reduced along the business cycle, and following both a
transitionary or a temporary shock, the flexible rule helps smooth aggregate variables.
From the theoretical perspective, the closest body of work is the literature modeling
stochastic shocks in endogenous growth models. King et al. (1988) et Stadler (1990) first
noticed that disturbances in the production function may lead to persistent fluctuations.
Such a framework has been extended in several directions. On the one hand, some
studies introduce, in a standard AK setup, a stochastic process affecting technology in
5In a deterministic configuration, many authors have shown that such endogenous growth models
are compatible with the existence of a growing public debt in the long-run; see, e.g., Minea and Villieu
(2010, 2012); Boucekkine et al. (2015a); Nishimura et al. (2015a,b); Menuet et al. (2018).
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discrete (Fatás, 2000; Jones et al., 2000; Menuet and Villieu, 2014) or continuous models
(Boucekkine et al., 2015b). On the other hand, Malley et al. (2007) specify a balanced
budget rule in a political economy setup. Our main innovation is to introduce public
debt dynamics by relaxing the balanced budget rule.
From the policy perspective, our paper considers a new flexible fiscal rule in indebted
economies with a stabilization effect both in case of permanent and transitory stocks.
This feature echoes the empirical studies suggesting that the implementation of second-
generation rules may be associated with less procyclicality or even counter-cyclicallity of
the fiscal stance (Bova et al., 2014; Guerguil et al., 2017; Combes et al., 2017)6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, section
3 solves the steady-states, section 4 studies the effect of the flexible fiscal rule in both
deterministic and stochastic environments, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
We consider a simple model based on a RBC methodology, but implemented in an
endogenous growth context. There are three infinitely-lived agents with perfect expecta-
tions: a representative firm, a representative household, and a government.
Firms. Following Barro (1990), population is normalized to unity, and output is pro-
duced using a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns, namely Yt = ΦtK
α
t G
1−α
t ,
where Kt and Gt respectively stands for private capital and productive public expendi-
ture, α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output to private capital, and Φ t is productivity.
As usual in RBC literature, productivity Φt is a stochastic function, namely Φt =
A exp(zt), with A > 0 a scale parameter, and zt a technology shock following an AR(1)
process
zt = ψzt−1 + νt, (1)
where {νt}t≥0 is a set of i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and variance σ2ν > 0, and ψ > 0 is
the autoregressive coefficient.
6See e.g., Gali and Perotti (2003); Manasse (2006); Fatás and Mihov (2012).
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The accumulation of private capital comes from investment (It) net of depreciation,
namely Kt+1 = It +(1− δ)Kt, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of capital depreciation per unit
of time. Thus, the first order conditions for profit maximization is
rt = α(1 − τ)
Yt
Kt
− δ. (2)
Notice that, as current shocks are known at the beginning of the period, the rate of return
on private capital (rt) is perfectly expected at period t.
Households. The representative household sets the consumption path {Ct}t≥0 to
maximize the time-separable logarithm utility function
U = Et
[
+∞∑
i=0
(
1
1 + β
)i
log(Ct+i)
]
, (3)
where β > 0 is the subjective discount rate.
Household use their income (Yt) to consume (Ct), to invest (It), to buy government
bonds (Bt), which return the real interest rate rt, and to pay taxes (τYt, where τ ∈ (0, 1)
is a proportional income tax rate). All variables are defined in real terms; hence the
following budget constraint
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + (1 − τ)Yt − Ct − It. (4)
First order conditions for the maximization of households’ program give rise to the
familiar Keynes-Ramsey relationship
1
Ct
=
(
1 + rt
1 + β
)
Et
[
1
Ct+1
]
, (5)
under the standard transversality condition
lim
t→+∞
(
1
1 + β
)t
Kt+1
Ct
= 0. (6)
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Government. The government provides public expenditures Gt, levies taxes, and bor-
rows from households. The government deficit is financed by issuing debt (Bt); hence,
the following budget constraint
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + Gt − τYt. (7)
Contrary to standard models that assume a balanced-budget rule, we introduce the
possibility of public debt financing in the long-run, so that public deficits may be perma-
nently financed by the debt accumulation. Effectively, many papers show that endogenous
growth setups are compatible with the existence of a growing public debt in the long-
run (Minea and Villieu, 2010, 2012; Boucekkine et al., 2015a; Nishimura et al., 2015a,b;
Menuet et al., 2018).7 The only requirement for the transversality condition to be verified
is that the rate of growth of public debt must be less than the real interest rate.
At this stage the model is not closed, because there is one free variable in the govern-
ment budget constraint (7). To close the model, the government must fix either the public
spending or the public debt path. As public expenditure is an endogenous variable, we
take the debt-to-output (Bt/Yt) that determines the public debt path as the instrument.
To this end, we specify the fiscal rule governing the changes of the debt-to-output ratio
as follows8
Bt+1
Yt+1
−
Bt
Yt
= μt
(
θ −
Bt
Yt
)
(8)
From (8), the fiscal policy instruments are the flat tax rate (τ) and the targeted debt-
to-output ratio in the long-run (θ). If the speed of adjustment of current debt to this
target is also an instrument (i.e. μt =: μ0), the evolution of the debt-to-output ratio does
not respond to changes in economic activity and describes a simple gradual process. In
this case, the fiscal rule is “fixed” and belongs to the so-called class of first generation
rules. Especially, a low value of μ0 characterizes a “gradualist” strategy (i.e. the speed
of adjustment would be small), and a high value accounts for a “shock therapy” strategy,
which gives rise to a faster reduction in the debt ratio.
7In such models, output grows continuously along the balanced-growth-path (BGP), and public debt
also may grow continuously, thus removing the balanced-budget-rule hypothesis in the long-run.
8Interestingly, such a fiscal rule is consistent to the unconditionally optimal fiscal policy (Horvath,
2011).
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In our model, in contrast, we consider a time-varying speed of adjustment. The speed
μt negatively depends on the gap between the long-run economic growth rate (γ
∗) and
the current growth rate (γt := (Yt+1 − Yt)/Yt), namely
μt = μ0 − ξ(γ
∗ − γt), (9)
where ξ > 0 reflects the flexibility degree of the fiscal rule.9 If ξ = 0 ⇒ μt = μ0, the fiscal
rule is fixed (first generation), as previously discussed. If ξ > 0, however, the fiscal rule
is “flexible” (second generation).
In long-run (γt = γ
∗) the speed of adjustment is simply μ0. This is no long the case in
the short-run: at a time of economic downturn (γt < γ
∗), the speed of adjustment slows
down (μt < μ0). From Eqs. (7), the public-spending-to-output ratio is
Gt
Yt
= τ − (rt − γt)
Bt
Yt
+ [μ0 − ξ(γ
∗ − γt)](1 + γt)
(
θ −
Bt
Yt
)
,
hence;
d
dξ
(
Gt
Yt
)
= −(1 + γt) (γ
∗ − γt)
(
θ −
Bt
Yt
)
.
Intuitively, following an adverse technological shock, the public-debt-to-GDP ratio
becomes higher than the long-run target (θ < Bt/Yt), exhibiting a counter-cyclical be-
havior of the public spending. Indeed, the ratio Gt/Yt increases as long as the current
growth is lower than the potential level (γt < γ
∗), and decreases in the opposite case
(γt > γ
∗).10 This feature is consistent with empirical studies suggesting that flexible fis-
cal rules are associated with counter-cyclical behavior of fiscal stance (Bova et al., 2014;
Guerguil et al., 2017; Combes et al., 2017), notably in occidental countries.
3. Equilibrium
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a path {Ct, Kt, Gt, Bt, Yt}∞0 which solves
Eqs. (2), (5), (7), (8), (9), the transversality condition, and satisfies the IS equilibrium
Kt+1 − Kt = Yt − Ct − Gt − δKt.
9To ensure μt > 0, we assume that μ0 is high enough.
10When a positive shock occurs (namely, θ > Bt/Yt), the public spending ratio exhibits a procyclical
behavior, i.e. Gt/Yt increases if and only if γt > γ∗. In this paper, we focus only on adverse shocks.
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Definition 2. A balanced-growth path (BGP) is a competitive equilibrium where con-
sumption, capital, public spending, public debt, and output grow at the same (endoge-
nous) rate γ.
To find endogenous growth solutions, we deflate all growing variables by the capital
stock to obtain long-run stationary ratios, namely: bkt := Bt/Kt, ykt := Yt/Kt, ckt :=
Ct/Kt, gkt := Gt/Kt, and the growth of the private capital is γkt := Kt+1/Kt − 1. The
dynamics system is described by the set of following equations.
i. Keynes-Ramsey relationship
1
ckt
=
(
1 + rt
1 + β
)
Et
[
1
ckt+1[1 + γkt]
]
, (10)
ii. IS equilibrium
γkt = ykt − ckt − gkt − δ, (11)
iii. The government’s budget constraint
bkt+1 =
(1 + rt)bkt + gkt − τykt
1 + γkt
, (12)
iv. Public debt path (where byt := Bt/Yt):
byt+1 = byt + [μ0 − ξ(γ
∗ − γkt)](θ − byt). (13)
v. Real interest rate
rt = α(1 − τ)ykt − δ, (14)
vi. Production function
ykt = exp(zt)Agk
1−α
t . (15)
The set (10)-(15) is a 6-equations systems, which needs to be solved.
3.1. Deterministic steady-state
Let us first characterize determinist solutions (νt = 0). In this case, the real interest
rate (rt) and all capital-deflated variables are constant in equilibrium. Therefore, as
stated in definition 2, all variables expressed in level grow at the same balanced rate (γ).
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To compute the steady-state(s), we proceed by induction. First, the long-run public
debt ratio is: bk = θyk. Thus, the public spending ratio in (12) leads to
gk = τyk − (r − γ)bk = [τ − (r − γ)θ]yk. (16)
From (16), under the balanced budget rule (θ = 0), the public spending just corre-
sponds to the Barro (1990)’s solution (i.e. gk = τyk). In contrast, public spending are
lower in the presence of public debt (θ > 0), since the standard transversality condition
ensures r > γ (see Minea and Villieu, 2012; Menuet et al., 2018). The basic mechanism
driving this crowding-out effect is the following. The public deficits generate (i) a perma-
nent flow of new resources (Bt+1 − Bt), and (ii) a permanent flow of new unproductive
expenditures (the debt burden rtBt). In steady state, the standard transversality condi-
tion (rt > γt = Bt+1/Bt) means that the latter dominates the former, thereby any rule
that permit permanent deficits involves net long-run costs for public finance, irrespective
of the precise nature of this rule.
At this stage, the steady-state output ratio is yk = A1/α[τ − (r−γ)θ](1−α)/α. As usual,
endogenous growth solution is obtain by the crossing-point of two relationships between
the real interest rate r and the economic growth rate γ. The first one comes from the
Keynes-Ramsey relationship (10)
γ = γc =
(
1 + r
1 + β
)
− 1. (17)
The second is directly linked to the government’s budget constraint
γ = γb =
1
θ
[(
r + δ
α(1 − τ)A1/α
)α/(1−α)
+ rθ − τ
]
. (18)
Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness) There is a critical discount rate δ > 0, such
that, if δ < δ, there is an unique BGP. Especially, in the long run, the targeted debt ratio
reduces the economic growth rate.
Proof: See Appendix.
For a small discount rate (δ < δ), relations (17)-(18) cross once at point (r∗, γ∗). The
intuition is as follows. On the one hand, Eq. (17) describes a linear increasing relationship
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through the optimal saving behaviour of households, as depicted in Figure 1. On the other
hand, Eq. (18) gives rise to a convex increasing curve between the economic growth
rate and the interest rate. Indeed, in the government’s budget constraint, economic
growth reduces the public debt burden in the long run, boosts productive public spending,
and increases the marginal productivity of private capital in the bond market clearing
condition (as rt = α(1 − τ)g
1−α
k − δ).
r∗
γ∗
0
Keynes-Ramsey
Budget constraint
•
Figure 1: Long-run equilibrium
Our simulation below shows that the unique steady-state is saddle-path stable, ensur-
ing the local and global determinacy of the model. In steady-state, due to the crowding-
out on productive public expenditures, the lower the debt ratio (θ), the higher the eco-
nomic growth rate (γ).
3.2. A numerical illustration
Our simulations are based on reasonable values for parameters (see Table 1). We
choose a usual discount rate ρ = 0.02 to match long-run historical data for the risk-free
real interest rate. The consumption elasticity of substitution (inverse of the risk-aversion
coefficient) is fixed at S = 1. As regards the technology, we set A = 0.5 to obtain
a realistic rate of economic growth, and the capital share in the production function is
α = 0.7, as in Gomes et al. (2013), close to the value (0.715) used by Gomme et al. (2011).
Such a capital share allows reproducing the empirical results of Munnell (1990) on the
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elasticity of output to productive public spending (1 −α = 0.3). The depreciation rate of
capital is set at δ = 0.05, which roughly corresponds to the average value of depreciation
rates used in Gomme et al. (2011).
PARAMETERS
β 0.02 Discount rate
A 0.5 Productivity parameter
α 0.7 Capital share in the production function
δ 0.05 Depreciation rate
τ 0.38 Tax rate on income
θ 0.572 Long-run deficit ratio (target value)
TARGET VALUES
Model Data Source
Long-run economic growth 0.034 0.033 BEA, 1950-2015
After-tax return of capital 0.054 0.0516 Gomme et al. (2011)
Investment to capital ratio 0.084 0.088 Gillman and Kejak (2011)
Public debt to GDP 0.572 0.572 BEA, 1950-2015
Public spending to GDP 0.367 0.366 OECD, 1970-2015
Table 1: Baseline Calibration (high BGP)
Despite the highly-stylized nature of the deterministic model, the baseline calibration
allows obtaining quite realistic results, close to postwar US annual data. The BGP
is characterized by a 3.4% long-run rate of economic growth (3.3% in the data). The
calibration well reproduces the after-tax rate of return of capital (5.4%, while the average
mean on 1954-2008 in Gomme et al. (2011) is 5.16%), the investment to capital ratio
(0.084), which is close to the estimate (0.088) used in Gillman and Kejak (2011), and the
public-spending-to-GDP ratio is 36.7% (36.6% in the data).
4. The stabilization role of flexible FR
This section provides some simulations to study the effect of the flexibility degree of
the fiscal rule on aggregated variables both in case of permanent and transitory shocks,
respectively.
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4.1. A permanent shock
Let us analyzing the adjustment of variables following a drop in the debt target (from
100% to 50% of GDP) in the deterministic framework. Figures 7a-b depict the IRF of the
debt-to-GDP ratio (byt), the deficit-to-GDP (dt), the ratios of consumption (ckt), public
expenditure (gkt), output (ykt), per unit of capital, and the growth rate (γt).
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Figure 2: Transitory dynamics following a reduction of the long-run debt target
In the long-run, the rate of economic growth unambiguously increases, following the
rise in productive public spending. In the short-run, nevertheless, the impact of the
change in the debt target depends on the flexibility degree of the fiscal rule. In what
follows, we consider two policies: a “flexible” rule (ξ = 1, the dashed line), and a “fixe”
rule (ξ = 0, the continuous line).
In Figure 7a (μ0 = 0.05), all the adjustments are slower under a flexible rule. Without
taking into account the business cycle (ξ = 0), the variables come back to equilibrium
after 50 quarters, and after 150 quarters under a flexible rule (ξ = 1).
However, the fixe rule is, in the short run, a costly policy. As the public deficit
immediately decreases, the economy lacks productive public spending, hence a decline
of output and consumption. During the transition path, these initial costs are reduced,
because the debt burden and the crowing out effects decrease. Finally, in the long-run,
the output ratio, the consumption ratio and the public investment ratio are higher than
initially. Finally, as depicted in Figure 6.12b (μ0 = 0.15), the flexible rule results in a
stabilizing effect of the economic growth rate.
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4.2. Transitory shocks
Let us now analyze the adjustment of variables following an adverse technological
shock.11 In Figure 8 (for a autoregressive coefficient φ = 0.9), we represent the fluctua-
tions in economic growth and in speed of adjustment, as deviations from their long-run
values (in %). Two points deserve particular attention.
First, the transitory shock is strongly amplified during the transition path and gives
birth to persistent business fluctuations. Indeed, our model produces a new transmission
channel based on the dynamics of public debt. The basic mechanism is as follows. When
an adverse technological shock occurs, the total factor productivity and the output de-
crease, raising the debt-to-GDP ratio. In return, the government will reduce the primary
deficit and cuts in public spending to keep the debt ratio consistent with the long-term
target. This lack of productive public expenditure leads to a recession effect, and the
harmful circle is renewed.
Second, the strength of business cycles crucially depends on the nature of the public
debt adjustment. Indeed, the higher the flexibility degree, the lower the magnitudes of
fluctuations (the variance of the output, in ratio to the steady-state, is 0.57 for ξ = 0,
and 0.29 for ξ = 1). The stabilization effect of the flexible fiscal rule comes from the
endogenous speed of adjustment: following an adverse technological shock, the speed of
adjustment is lower than the long-run level that reduces the cuts in productive spend-
ing, smoothing the recessive effects. In contrast, under a fixe fiscal rule (ξ = 0), the
speed of adjustment equals the constant long-run level (μt = μ0, ∀t) that amplifies the
transitionary shocks.
11We assume μ0 = 0.25 to ensure than μt > 0, for any t ≥ 0.
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Figure 3: Adjustment following an adverse technological shock: deviation from steady-state (in %)
5. Conclusion
Our paper develops a stochastic endogenous growth model. We develop a flexible rule,
such that the speed of adjustment of the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the business cycle.
We reveal that such a rule helps smooth aggregate variables, and leads to a stabilization
effect by limiting the lack of productive public spending.
An interesting extension of our analysis would consist in providing a political economy
mechanism to endogenize the policy instruments (as the long-run debt target, or the
speed of adjustment). Besides, further works could attempt to build a general model
connecting DSGE models with an endogenous growth framework. The introduction of
nominal rigidities, and the specification of policymakers’ preferences could open the way
for a laboratory model encompasses both long-run economic growth and business cycles.
These two possible directions are left for future research.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1.
From Eqs. (17)-(18), the interest rate steady-state is given by the implicit relation
Ψ(r) = 0, where
Ψ(r) :=
(
1 + r
1 + β
)
− 1 −
1
θ
[(
r + δ
α(1 − τ)A1/α
)α/(1−α)
+ rθ − τ
]
.
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Clearly Ψ ∈ C2(R+), with
Ψ′(r) = −
β
1 + β
−
1
θα(1 − τ)A1/α
(
α
1 − α
)(
r + δ
α(1 − τ)A1/α
)(2α−1)/(1−α)
< 0.
In addition, Ψ(+∞) = −∞, as α > 1/2, and Ψ(0) > 0 ⇔ δ < δ := α(1 − τ)A1/α[τ −
βθ
1+β
](1−α)/α. As τ > θ, it follows that δ > 0. Consequently, according to the Intermediate
Value Theorem, if α > 1/2 and δ < δ, there is a unique critical value r∗ > 0 such that
Ψ(r∗) = 0. This value defines the real interest rate at the steady-state. The associated
level of economic growth is γ∗ = (1 + r∗)/(1 + β) − 1 > 0.
Besides, we compute
∂Ψ(r)
∂θ
=
1
θ2
[(
r + δ
α(1 − τ)A1/α
)α/(1−α)
+ rθ − τ
]
−
r
θ
.
At the steady-state, it follows that
∂Ψ(r)
∂θ
∣
∣
∣
∣
r=r∗
= −
β(1 + r∗)
θ(1 + β)
< 0.
Thus, as Ψ′(r∗) < 0, according to the Implicit Function Theorem, we have, in equilibrium,
∂r∗/∂θ < 0 and ∂γ∗/∂θ < 0.
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